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Personalizing Path-Specific Effects
Abstract
Unlike classical causal inference, which often has an aver-
age causal effect of a treatment within a population as a tar-
get, in settings such as personalized medicine, the goal is
to map a given unit’s characteristics to a treatment tailored
to maximize the expected outcome for that unit. Obtaining
high-quality mappings of this type is the goal of the dynamic
regime literature (Chakraborty and Moodie 2013), with con-
nections to reinforcement learning and experimental design.
Aside from the average treatment effects, mechanisms be-
hind causal relationships are also of interest. A well-studied
approach to mechanism analysis is establishing average ef-
fects along with a particular set of causal pathways, in the
simplest case the direct and indirect effects. Estimating
such effects is the subject of the mediation analysis literature
(Robins and Greenland 1992; Pearl 2001).
In this paper, we consider how unit characteristics may be
used to tailor a treatment assignment strategy that maximizes
a particular path-specific effect. In healthcare applications,
finding such a policy is of interest if, for instance, we are
interested in maximizing the chemical effect of a drug on an
outcome (corresponding to the direct effect), while assuming
drug adherence (corresponding to the indirect effect) is set to
some reference level.
To solve our problem, we define counterfactuals associated
with path-specific effects of a policy, give a general identi-
fication algorithm for these counterfactuals, give a proof of
completeness, and show how classification algorithms in ma-
chine learning (Chen, Zeng, and Kosorok 2016) may be used
to find a high-quality policy. We validate our approach via a
simulation study.
Introduction
Establishing causal relationships between action and out-
come is fundamental to rational decision-making. A gold
standard for establishing causal relationships is the random-
ized controlled trial (RCT), which may be used to establish
average causal effects within a population. Causal inference
is a branch of statistics that seeks to predict effects of RCTs
from observational data, where treatment assignment is not
randomized. Such data is often gathered in observational
studies, surveys given to patients during follow up, and in
hospital electronic medical records.
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While RCTs and causal inference methods that predict re-
sults of hypothetical RCTs establish whether a particular ac-
tion is helpful on average, optimal decision makingmust tai-
lor decisions to specific situations. In the context of causal
inference this involves finding a map between characteris-
tics of an experimental unit, such as baseline features, to an
action that optimizes some outcome for that unit. Methods
for finding such maps are studied in the dynamic treatment
regime literature, and in off-policy reinforcement learning.
If an action is known to have a beneficial effect on
some outcome, it is often desirable to understand the causal
mechanism behind this effect. A popular type of mech-
anism analysis is mediation analysis, which seeks to de-
compose the average causal effects into direct and indi-
rect components, or more generally into components asso-
ciated with specific causal pathways. These components
of the average causal effect are known as direct, indirect,
and path-specific effects, and are also defined as a pop-
ulation average (Robins and Greenland 1992; Pearl 2001;
Avin, Shpitser, and Pearl 2005). In this paper we introduce
methods to personalize these types of effects, that is find
mappings from unit characteristics to actions that maximize
some path-specific effect.
Why Personalize Path-Specific Effects?
Just as it often makes sense to structure decision-making
such that the overall effect of an action on the outcome is
maximized for any specific unit, in some cases it is appropri-
ate to choose an action such that only a part of the effect of
an action on the outcome is maximized. Consider manage-
ment of care of HIV patients. Since HIV is a chronic disease,
care for HIV patients involves designing a long-term treat-
ment plan to minimize chances of viral failure (an undesir-
able outcome). In designing such a plan, an important choice
is initiation of primary therapy, and a switch to a second line
therapy. Initiating or switching too early risks unneeded side
effects and ”wasting” treatment efficacy, while initiating or
switching too late risks viral failure (Hernan et al. 2006).
However, in the context of HIV, treatment adherence is an
important component of the overall effect of the drug on the
outcome. Patients who do not take prescribed doses compro-
mise the efficacy of the drug, and different drugs may have
different levels of adherence. Thus, in HIV the overall effect
of the drug can be viewed as a combination of the chemical
effect, and the adherence effect (Miles et al. 2017). There-
fore, choosing an action that maximizes the overall effect
of HIV treatment on viral failure entangles these two very
different mechanisms. One approach to tailoring treatments
to patients in a way that disentangles these mechanisms is to
find a policy that optimizes a part of the effect, say the chem-
ical (direct) effect of the drug, while hypothetically keeping
the adherence levels to some reference level. Finding such
a policy yields information on how best to assign drugs to
maximize their chemical efficacy in settings where adher-
ence levels can be controlled to a reference level – even if
the only data available is one where patients have differen-
tial adherence.
Preliminaries
We will consider causal models represented by acyclic di-
rected graphs (DAGs), and acyclic directed mixed graphs
(ADMGs) representing classes of DAGs with hidden vari-
ables. A DAG is a graph with directed (→) edges with no
directed cycles, an ADMG is a graph with directed (→) and
bidirected (↔) edges with no directed cycles.
Graph Theory
We will define statistical and causal models as sets of distri-
butions defined by restrictions associated with graphs. Thus
we will use vertices and variables interchangeably – capital
letters for a vertex or variable (V ), bold capital letter for a
set (V), small letters for values (v), and bold small letters
for sets of values (v). For a set of values a ofA, and a sub-
set A† ⊆ A, define aA† to be a restriction of a to elements
in A†. We will assume graphs with a vertex set V. The
state space of A will be denoted by XA, and the (Cartesian
product) state space ofA will be denoted by XA.
For a graph G, and any V ∈ V, we will define the fol-
lowing genealogic sets: parents, children, ancestors, descen-
dants, and siblings as: paG(V ) ≡ {W ∈ V | W → V },
chG(V ) ≡ {W ∈ V | V → W}, anG(V ) ≡ {W ∈ V |
W → . . . → V }, deG(V ) ≡ {W ∈ V | V → . . . → W}.
sibG(V ) ≡ {W ∈ V | V ↔W}. By convention, anG(V )∩
deG(V )∩disG(V ) = {V }. These sets generalize toV† ⊆ V
disjunctively. For example, paG(V
†) ≡
⋃
V ∈V† paG(V ).
ForA ⊆ V, define pasG(A) ≡ paG(A) \A.
We define the set ndG(V ) ≡ V \ deG(V ). The district of
V is defined as disG(V ) = {W ∈ V | W ↔ . . . ↔ V }.
The set of districts will be denoted by D(G), and it always
forms a partition of vertices in G. Given a graph G andA ⊆
V, denote by GA the subgraph of G containing only vertices
inA and edges between these vertices.
Statistical And Causal Models Of A DAG
A statistical model of a DAG or a Bayesian network, associ-
ated with a DAG G, is the set of distributions p(V) such that
p(V) =
∏
V ∈V p(V | paG(V )). Such a p(V) is said to be
Markov relative to G.
Causal models of a DAG are also sets of distributions,
but on counterfactual random variables. Given Y ∈ V and
A ⊆ V \ {Y }, a counterfactual variable, also known as a
potential outcome, and written as Y (a) represents variation
in Y in a hypothetical situation where A were set to values
a by an intervention operation (Pearl 2009). Given a set Y,
defineY(a) ≡ {Y}(a) ≡ {Y (a) | Y ∈ Y}.
Causal models of a DAG G can be viewed as model-
ing counterfactuals of the form V (a) where a are values
of paG(V ). These atomic counterfactuals model the rela-
tionship between paG(V ), representing direct causes of V ,
and V itself. From these, all other counterfactuals may be
defined using recursive substitution. For anyA ⊆ V \ {V },
V (a) ≡ V (apaG(V )∩A, {paG(V ) \A}(a)). (1)
A causal parameter is identified in a causal model if it is a
function of the observed data distribution p(V). In a causal
model of a DAG G, all interventional distributions
p({V \A}(a)) are identified by the g-formula:
p({V \A}(a)) =
∏
V ∈V\A
p(V |paG(V ) \A,apaG(V )∩A). (2)
Counterfactual responses to classical interventions are often
compared on the mean difference scale for two values a, a′,
representing cases and controls: E[Y (a)] − E[Y (a′)]. This
quantity is known as the average causal effect (ACE).
Edge Interventions
A more general type of intervention is the edge interven-
tion (Shpitser and Tchetgen Tchetgen 2016), which maps
a set of directed edges in G to values of their source
vertices. We will write the mapping of a set of edges
to values of their source vertices as the following short-
hand: (a1W1)→, (a2W2)→, . . . , (akWk)→ to mean that
edge (A1W1)→ is assigned to value a1, (A2W2)→ is as-
signed to value a2, and so on until (AkWk)→ is assigned
to value ak. Alternatively, we will write aα to mean edges
in α are mapped to values in the multiset a (since multiple
edges may share the same source vertex, and be assigned to
different values). For a subset β ⊆ α, and an assignment aα
denote aβ to be a restriction of aα to edges in β.
We will write counterfactual responses to edge inter-
ventions as Y (aα) or, for a small set of edges, as:
Y ((aY )→, (a
′M)→) meaning the response to Y where A
is set to value a for the purposes of the edge (AY )→
and to a′ for the purposes of the edge (AM)→. An
edge intervention that sets a set of edges α to values a as
(a1W1)→, (a2W2)→, . . . , (akWk)→ is defined via the fol-
lowing generalization of (1):
Y (aα) ≡ Y (a{(ZY )→∈α}, {pa
α¯
G(Y )}(aα)), (3)
where paα¯G(Y ) ≡ {W ∈ paG(Y ) | (WY )→ 6∈ α}.
Given Aα ≡ {A | (AB)→ ∈ α}, and an edge inter-
vention given by the mapping aα, under the non-parametric
structural equation model with independent errors (NPSEM-
IE) of a DAG G, the joint distribution of the counterfactual
responses p({V (aα) | V ∈ V \Aα}) is identified, via the
edge g-formula, which is the following generalization of (2):∏
V ∈V\Aα
p(V |a{(ZV )→∈α},pa
α¯
G(V )). (4)
For example, in Fig 1 (a), p(Y ((aY )→, (a
′M)→)) =∑
W,M p(Y | a,M,W )p(M | a
′,W )p(W ). This is some-
times known as the mediation formula (Pearl 2011).
Counterfactual responses to edge interventions represent
effects of treatments A along some but not all causal path-
ways. In simplest cases, these responses can be used, often
on the mean difference scale, to define direct and indirect
effects (Robins and Greenland 1992),(Pearl 2001). For ex-
ample, in the model given by the DAG in Fig 1 (a), the di-
rect effect ofA on Y is defined as E[Y ((aY )→, (aM)→)]−
E[Y ((a′Y )→, (aM)→)] which is equal to E[Y (a)] −
E[Y (a′,M(a))]. The indirect effect may be defined simi-
larly as E[Y ((a′Y )→, (aM)→)]−E[Y ((a′Y )→, (a′M)→)],
which is equal toE[Y (a′,M(a))]−E[Y (a′)]. The direct and
indirect effects defined in this way add up to the ACE.
Edge interventions represent a special case of a more gen-
eral notion of a path-specific effect (Pearl 2001) which, un-
like path-specific effects, happens to always be identified un-
der an NPSEM-IE of a DAG, via (4). Path-specific effects
may not be identified even in a DAG model, due to the pres-
ence of a recanting witness (Avin, Shpitser, and Pearl 2005).
Responses To Treatment Policies
In settings such as personalized medicine, counterfactual re-
sponses to conditional interventions that set treatment values
in response to other variables via a known function are of-
ten of interest. Given a DAG G, a topological ordering ≺,
and a set A ⊆ V, for each A ∈ A, define WA to be some
subset of predecessors of A according to ≺. Then, given a
set of functions fA of the form fA : XWA 7→ XA, we de-
fine Y (fA), the counterfactual response Y ∈ V to A being
intervened on according to fA ≡ {fA | A ∈ A}, as
Y ({fA(WA(fA)|A ∈ paG(Y ) ∩A}), {paG(Y ) \A}(fA)).
(5)
As an example, in the graph in Fig. 1 (b), if we
are interested in evaluating the efficacy of a policy set
{fA1 : XW0 7→ XA1 , fA2 : X{W0,W1} 7→ XA2} as
far as their effect on the outcome W2, we could eval-
uate it via the random variable Y (fA1 , fA2) defined as
W2(fA2 (W1(fA1(W0),W0),W0),W1(fA1 (W0),W0), fA1 (W0),W0).
The efficacy of a particular set of policies may be evaluated
on the mean scale as E[Y (fA1 , fA2)]. In a causal model of
a DAG, given any policy set, the effect of fA on V \ A,
represented by the distribution p({V (fA) | V ∈ V \A)}),
is identified by the following modification of (2):∏
V ∈V\A
p(V |{fA(WA(fA))|A∈A∩paG(V )}, {paG(V )\A}(fA)).
(6)
For example, p(Y (fA, fZ)) is identified as∑
W0,W1
p(W2|W0, fA1(W0),W1, fA2(W0,W1))×
p(W1|W0, fA1(W0))p(W0). (7)
Identification In Hidden Variable DAGs
In a causal model of a DAG where some variables are un-
observed, not every causal parameter is identifiable, that is
not every parameter is a function of the observed data dis-
tribution. Given a DAG G with a vertex set V ∪H, where
W
A
M
Y
(a)
W0
A1
W1
U
A2
W2
(b)
W
A
M
Y
(c)
Figure 1: (a) A simple causal DAG, with a single treatment
A, a single outcomeY , a vectorW of baseline variables, and
a single mediatorM . (b) A more complex causal DAG with
two treatments A1, A2, an intermediate outcome W1, and
the final outcomeW2. (c) A graph where p(Y (a,M(a
′))) is
identified, but p(Y (fA(W ),M(a))) is not.
V are observed, andH are hidden, define a latent projection
G(V) to be an ADMG with observed variables V with an
edge (AB)→ if there exists a directed path from A to B in
G with all intermediate vertices in H, and an edge (AB)↔
if there exists a path without consecutive edges → ◦ ←
from A to B with the first edge on the path of the form
A ← and the last edge on the path of the form → B.
A variable pair in G(V) may be connected by both a di-
rected and a bidirected edge. It is known that all hidden
variable DAGs which share latent projections share identifi-
cation theory. Thus, we will describe identification results
on latent projection ADMGs directly. General algorithms
for identification of interventional distributions were given
in (Tian and Pearl 2002),(Shpitser and Pearl 2006), for re-
sponses to edge interventions in (Shpitser 2013), and for
policies in (Tian 2008). Here we reformulate these results
via simple one line formulas using conditional ADMGs and
a fixing operator.
Conditional ADMGs, Kernels, And Fixing
A conditional ADMG (CADMG) G(V,W) is an ADMG
whereW are fixed vertices with the additional property that
for allW ∈W, sibG(W )∩ paG(W ) = ∅. A kernel qV(V |
W) is a mapping from XW to normalized densities overV.
A conditional distribution is one type of kernel, but others
are possible. Conditioning and marginalization are defined
in kernels in the usual way. ForA ⊆ V,
qV(A|W) ≡
∑
V\A
qV(V|W); qV(V \A|A ∪W) ≡
qV(A|W)
qV(A|W)
.
For A ∈ V, a fixing operator φA(G(V,W)) produces
a new CADMG G(V \ {A},W ∪ {A}), where all edges
into A are removed. For a CADMG G(V,W) and kernel
qV(V | W), and A ∈ V, a fixing operator φA(qV;G) pro-
duces a new kernel q˜V\{A}(V\{A} |W∪{A}) ≡ qV(V |
W)/qV(A |W ∪ ndG(A)).
A sequence 〈A1, A2, . . . , Ak〉 of vertices in V is
said to be fixable if A1 is fixable in G, A2 is fix-
able in φA1(G), and so on, with Ak being fixable in
φAk−1(. . . φA2(φA1 (G)) . . .). A consequence of a theorem
in (Richardson et al. 2017) states that if p(H∪V) is Markov
relative to G(H∪V), for any two sequences 〈Ai1 , . . . , Aik〉,
〈Aj1 , . . . , Ajk〉 fixable in G(V), graphs and kernels obtained
from applying these sequences to G(V) and p(V) are the
same. For this reason, we will consider fixable sets. A set
is fixable in G if it is possible to arrange its elements into a
fixable sequence. All sequences are fixable in a DAG. ForA
fixable in G, we will define φA(.), applied to either graphs
or kernels, to be a composition of φ applied in order to some
fixable sequence of elements in A. If A ⊆ V is fixable in
G, then the setV \A is called a reachable set.
Given a kernel qV(V | W) ≡ φW(p(V ∪W);G(V ∪
W)), and given a ∈ XA, for A ⊆ W, define φaW(p(V ∪
W);G(V ∪W)) to be a kernel q˜V(V | W \A) such that
for anyw ∈ XW\A, q˜V(V | w) = qV(V | w, a).
Identification Algorithms Via The Fixing Operator
A complete algorithm for identifying interventional distri-
butions of the form p(Y(a)) for Y ⊆ V \A was given in
(Tian and Pearl 2002). This algorithm can be rephrased us-
ing the fixing operator as follows. Let Y∗ ≡ anGV\A(Y).
Then if for every D ∈ D(GY∗), D is reachable in G, then
forY ⊆ V \A,
p(Y(a)) =
∑
Y∗\Y
∏
D∈D(GY∗ )
φ
apas
G
(D)
V\D (p(V);G). (8)
If some D ∈ D(GY∗) is not reachable in G, p(Y(a)) is not
identifiable. See theorem 60 in (Richardson et al. 2017).
Identification of path-specific effects where each path is
associated with one of two possible value sets a, a′ was
given a general characterization in (Shpitser 2013) via the
recanting district criterion. Here, we reformulate this result
in terms of the fixing operator in a way that generalizes (8),
and applies to the response of any edge intervention, includ-
ing those that set edges to multiple values rather than two.
This result can also be viewed as a generalization of node
consistency of edge interventions in DAG models, found in
(Shpitser and Tchetgen Tchetgen 2016).
Given Aα ≡ {A | (AB)→ ∈ α}, and an edge interven-
tion given by the mapping aα, define Y
∗ ≡ anGV\Aα (Y).
The joint distribution of the counterfactual response p({V \
Aα}(aα)) is identified, under the NPSEM-IE, if and only
if p({V \Aα}(a)) is identified via (8), and for every D ∈
D(GY∗), for every A ∈ Aα, either every directed edge out
of A into D is in α and aα agrees on value assignments to
those edges, or every directed edge out of A intoD is not in
α.
Theorem 1 Under above assumptions, p({V\Aα}(aα)) is∑
Y∗\Y
∏
D∈D(GY∗ )
φ
a{(AD)→∈α|D∈D,A6∈D}
V\D (p(V);G). (9)
A general algorithm for identification of responses to a set
of policies fA is given in (Tian 2008). We again reformulate
this algorithm in terms of the fixing operator. Define a graph
GfA to be a graph obtained from G by removing all edges
into A, and adding for any A ∈ A, directed edges from
WA to A. Define Y
∗ ≡ anGfA (Y) \ A. Then p(Y(fA))
is identified in G if p(Y∗(a)) is identified. Moreover, the
identification formula is∑
(Y∗∪A)\Y
∏
D∈D(GY∗ )
φ
a˜pas
G
(D)∩A
V\D
(p(V);G), (10)
where a˜pasG(D)∩A is defined to be {A = fA(WA) | A ∈
paG(D) ∩ A} if paG(D) ∩ A is not empty, and is defined
to be the empty set otherwise. The sum overA is vacuous if
fA is a set of deterministic policies.
Path-Specific Policies
Fix a set of directed edges α, and define Aα ≡ {A |
(AB)→ ∈ α} as before. Denote α¯ to be the set of out-
going edges from elements in Aα not in α. Consider a set
{WA | A ∈ Aα} defined as before with respect to a topo-
logical ordering ≺. We are going to consider a simple ver-
sion of path-specific policies where for variables in A we
wish to intervene on, all outgoing edges for everyA ∈ A are
either associated with a reference policy f ′A : XWA 7→ XA
(for edges not in α), or a policy of interest fA : XWA 7→ XA
(for edges in α). Our results generalize to more complex
types of path-specific policies, but we do not pursue this here
in the interests of space. Generally, we will let f ′A be a sim-
ple policy that sets A to a reference value a, ignoring WA.
Such reference policies are the most relevant in practice.
We now define counterfactual responses to these types
of policies, which we denote by (f˜A)α,α = (fA)α, (f
′
A
)α,
where fA ≡ {fA | A ∈ A}, f ′A ≡ {f
′
A | A ∈ A},
f˜A = fA ∪ f ′A, and the subscripts α, α are meant to de-
note that these policies only apply for the purposes of those
respective edge sets. Define Y ((f˜A)α,α) as
Y ({f ′A(WA((f˜A)α,α)|(AY ) ∈ α},
{fA(WA((f˜A)α,α)|(AY ) ∈ α}, {W ((f˜A)α,α)|(WY ) 6∈ α, α})
This definition generalizes both (4) and (5) in an ap-
propriate way. As an example, in Fig. 1 (a), a pol-
icy fA(W ) that sets A to a value only with respect to
the edge (AY )→, and a reference value a that A assumes
with respect to the edge (AM)→ results in the counter-
factual Y (fA(W ),M(a,W ),W ). In the graph in Fig. 1
(b), the response of W2 to A1, A2 being set according
to fA1(W0), fA2(W1, A1,W0) with respect to (A1W2)→,
(A2W2)→, and set to a1, a2 for all other edges, is
W2(fA2(W1(a1,W0), a1,W0),W1(a1,W0), fA1(W0),W0).
(11)
Identification Of Path-Specific Policies
Having condensed existing identification results on re-
sponses to policies (10) and responses to edge interventions
arising in mediation analysis (9), we generalize these results
to give an identification result for responses to path-specific
policies, via the following theorem
Theorem 2 Define G
f˜Aα
as GfA before, and let Y
∗ ≡
anG
f˜Aα
(Y) \ Aα. Then p(Y((f˜A)α,α)) is identified if
p(Y∗(a)) is identified, and for every D ∈ D(GY∗), and
every A ∈ Aα, either every directed edge out of A into D
is in α, or every directed edge out of A into D is not in α.
Moreover, the identifying formula is∑
(Y∗∪Aα)\Y
∏
D∈D(GY∗ )
φ
a˜pas
G
(D)∩Aα
V\D
(p(V);G), (12)
A1
W0 M1
W1
W2
(a)
W0 M1
W1
W2
(b)
W0
A1
M1
W1
U
A2
M2
W2
(c)
Figure 2: (a) A causal model where
p(W2({fA1(W0)}(A1W1)→ , a(A1M1)→)) is identified.
(b) The graph GY∗ , where Y∗ = {W0,M1,W1,W2}
obtained from (a). (c) A causal model representing the
chemical effect of HIV mediation, and adherence on viral
failure.
where a˜pasG(D)∩Aα is defined to be {A = fA(WA) | A ∈
paαG(D) ∩ Aα} ∪ {A = f
′
A(WA) | A ∈ pa
α
G(D) ∩ Aα},
if paG(D) ∩Aα is not empty, and is defined to be the empty
set otherwise.
Responses to path-specific policies are identified in strictly
fewer cases compared to responses to edge interventions.
This is because Y∗ is a larger set in the former case. As
an example, consider the graph in Fig. 1 (c), where we
are interested either in the counterfactual p(Y (a,M(a′))),
used to define pure direct effects, and the counterfactual
p(Y (fA(W ),M(a
′))).
For the former, we have Y∗ = {Y,M}, and
p(Y (a,M(a′))) equal to∑
m
(∑
w p(Y,m|a,w)p(w)∑
w
p(m | a,w)p(w)
)∑
w
p(m | a′, w)p(w)
We omit the detailed derivation in the interests of space.
For the latter, however, Y∗ = {Y,M,W}, and since
α = {(AY )→} and α¯ = {(AM)→}, Theorem 2 is insuf-
ficient to conclude identification. An example where iden-
tification is possible is shown in Fig. 1 (b). Here, we are
interested in optimizing the direct effect of A1 and A2 on
W2 via policies fA1(W0) and fA2(W1,W0), while keeping
the indirect effect of A1 on W2 through W1 at a reference
level W1(a1). This yields the counterfactual (11), which is
identified as∑
W0,W1
p(W2|fA2(W1,W0),W1, fA1(W0),W0)p(W1|a1,W0)p(W0).
Generalizations of the example in Fig. 1 (b) are the most
relevant in practice, as their causal structure corresponds to
longitudinal observational studies, of the kind considered in
(Robins 1986), and many other papers. However, we illus-
trate complications that may arise in identifiability of re-
sponses to path-specific policies with the following, more
complex, example in Fig. 2 (a). Here, the distribution
p(W2({fA1(W0)}(A1W1)→ , a(A1M1)→)) is identified via:
∑
W0,A1,M1,W1
[p(W1 |M1, fA1(W0),W0)] [p(M1 | a1,W0)p(W0)]×[∑
W0,A1
p(W2 |W1,M1, A1,W0)p(A1,W0)
]
,
with the detailed derivation given in the Appendix. In this
example, the graph entails an identifying formula that does
not resemble a factorization where a conditional distribu-
tion of the treatment A1 is replaced by a policy fA1 , such as
(7). Instead, due to the presence of a bidirected arrow con-
nectingA1 andW2, the identifying functional resembles the
functional arising from the front-door criterion (Pearl 2009).
On Completeness
The ID algorithm phrased in terms of (8) via the fixing op-
erator is known to be complete for non-parametric identifi-
cation (Huang and Valtorta 2006; Shpitser and Pearl 2006).
Completeness here means that failure of identification
means no other method is able to yield identification un-
der the same model. A similar result does not, to the au-
thors’ knowledge, exist for the identification algorithm for
responses to policies in (Tian 2008), and rephrased as (10).
Here we give an argument for completeness of algorithms
corresponding to (10), and (18) under the assumption that
not only is the causal model non-parametric, but the set of
policies fA consists of arbitrary functions. In other words,
to show non-identifiability it will suffice to exhibit two un-
restricted elements in the causal model, and any set of func-
tions fA such that the two elements agree on p(V) but dis-
agree on p(Y(fA)). If the set of policies of interest fA is
restricted, or alternatively if the causal model has paramet-
ric restrictions, completeness may no longer hold. To see
this, consider Fig. 1 (c) where we pick functions fA(W )
that sets A to a for the purposes of (AY )→, and f
′
A(W )
that sets A to a′ for the purposes of (AM)→. In other
words, both functions ignore W . In this restricted class,
p(Y ((fA)(AY )→ , (f
′
A)(AM)→)) is in fact identifiable, since
this distribution is equal to p(Y (a,M(a′))), which was
shown to be identifiable in the previous section. We defer
all proofs to the Appendix.
Lemma 1 Assume p1(Y (a) | w) 6= p2(Y (a) | w), and a
fixed p1(W ), p2(W ) (either equal or not). Then there exists
p˜(A | W ) such that
∑
w,a p1(Y (a) | w)p˜(a | w)p1(w) 6=
p˜1(Y ) 6= p˜2(Y ) =
∑
w,a p2(Y (a) | w)p˜(a | w)p2(w).
Theorem 3 Assume p({Y (a) | Y ∈ Y∗}) is not identifi-
able, where Y∗ = anGfA (Y) \ A. Then p({Y (fA) | Y ∈
Y}) is not identifiable.
Lemma 2 Assume a fixed p1(W ),p2(W ) (equal
or not), and p1(Y1(a1, a2), Y2(a1, a2)|w) 6=
p2(Y1(a1, a2), Y2(a1, a2)|w). Then there exists
p˜(A1|W ), p˜2(A2|W ) such that∑
w,a1,a2
p1(Y1(a1, a2), Y2(a1, a2)|w)p˜(a1|w)p˜(a2|w)p(w) 6=
∑
w,a1,a2
p2(Y1(a1, a2), Y2(a1, a2)|w)p˜(a1|w)p˜(a2|w)p(w).
Theorem 4 LetY∗ = anGfAα
(Y)\Aα. Then if p(Y∗(aα))
is not identifiable, p(Y((f˜A)α,α)) is not identifiable.
Finding Optimal Total Effect Policies
Generally, having defined counterfactual responses to poli-
cies, the goal is to find an optimal policy. Optimality may
be quantified in a number of ways, but a common approach
is maximizing expected counterfactual outcome under a pol-
icy, that is finding argmaxfA E[Y (fA)].
Consider a simple example in Fig. 1 (a), where we wish to
learn the optimal policy fA(W ), by which we mean a pol-
icy that maximizes E[Y (fA(W ))]. Assume we happen to
know the correct parametric specification forQ(A,W ; γ) =
E[Y (A) | W ; γ] = E[Y |A,W ; γ] (this type of specification
is sometimes known as a Q-function in the reinforcement
learning literature). Then for a binary treatmentA (with val-
ues 0, 1), it is fairly easy to show that for any givenw ∈ XW ,
the optimal policy has the form I(Q(1, w; γ) > Q(0, w; γ)),
where I(.) is the indicator function.
Consider a general version of Fig. 1 (b), with a vector of
baseline factors W0, a set of treatments Ai, and outcomes
Wi for i = 1, . . . , k, and a temporal order on variables
W0, A1,W1, . . . , Ak,Wk, where all variables earlier in the
order are assumed to causally influence variables later in the
order, and an unobserved common parentU ofW0, . . . ,Wk.
Given Ai, denote Ai to be all variables earlier in the order-
ing than Ai, similarly for Wi and W i. Finally, denote by
A
−j
i to be all variables earlier in the ordering thanAi except
Aj , similarly forW
−j
i . Assume we are interested in choos-
ing a set of policies fA ≡ {fAi(Ai) | i = 1, . . . , k} which
maximize E[Wk(fA)].
It’s well-known that this counterfactual mean is identi-
fied, under the model we specified, via a version of the
g-computation algorithm (Robins 1986), a special case of
(10):∑
Wk
E[Wk |W0, . . . ,Wk−1, fA1(W0), . . . , fAk (Ak)]×
k−1∏
i=1
p(Wi |W0, . . . ,Wi−1, fA1(W0), . . . , fAi(Ai)). (13)
If we knew the correct specification of all these models,
we could obtain the optimal f∗Ak as I(E[Wk|Ak = 1, Ak] >
E[Wk|Ak = 0, Ak]), and the optimal f∗Ai as
I[E[Wk(f
∗
Ak
, . . . , f
∗
Ai+1
, Ai = 1)|Ai] >
E[Wk(f
∗
Ak
, . . . , f
∗
Ai+1
, Ai = 0)|Ai]] (14)
by an appropriate modification of (13). This approach is
known as dynamic programming or backwards induction.
Outcome Weighted Learning
If models in (13) are not known precisely, but their paramet-
ric form is known, theymay be estimated from data via usual
maximum likelihood methods, and resulting estimates used
to find the optimal policy given data. If we are uncertain
whether these models are correctly specified, we are natu-
rally no longer guaranteed to learn optimal policies directly
in this way. In addition even under a correctly specified
model, evaluating (14) may be computationally demanding,
as it involves integrating overWi, . . . ,Wk−1.
A number of alternative strategies for finding policies
where the optimal policy is not easily available in closed
form have been considered in the literature, including grid
search, and value search within a restricted class of poli-
cies. In this paper, we consider outcome weighted learning
(Chen, Zeng, and Kosorok 2016), which translates the prob-
lem of picking optimal policies into a weighted classification
problem in machine learning.
The key idea is if we had any method for learning
E[Wk(f
∗
Ak
, . . . , f∗Ai+1 , Ai) | Ai] for any Ai, the task for
finding f∗Ai , assuming f
∗
Ak
, . . . , f∗Ai+1 were already found
recursively, reduces to training a classifier mapping features
Ai to a class label A
∗
i (either 0 or 1). In typical binary clas-
sification problems, training a classifier entails minimizing
the 0-1 loss, where a correct classification is not penalized,
while an incorrect classification is penalized by 1. In our
case, we solve a sequence of recursive classification prob-
lems with a weighted 0-1 loss. In the base case, choosing
A∗k correctly yields no penalty, while choosing A
∗
k incor-
rectly yields the penalty
E[Wk | A
∗
k, Ak]− E[Wk | 1−A
∗
k, Ak].
Assuming f∗Ak , . . . , f
∗
Ai+1
were already selected via clas-
sifiers minimizing appropriate loss, choosing A∗i correctly
yields no penalty, while choosing A∗i incorrectly yields a
penalty
E[Wk(f
∗
Ak
, . . . , f
∗
Ai+1
, Ai = A
∗
i ) | Ai]−
E[Wk(f
∗
Ak
, . . . , f
∗
Ai+1
, Ai = 1− A
∗
i ) | Ai].
A number of approaches have been developing for mini-
mizing these types of non-convex losses. While any choice
that specifies some inductive bias may imply the true opti-
mal policy is no longer within the considered class, a flexi-
ble classification strategy minimizes this risk in practice. In
our simulations, we used support vector machines (SVMs)
(Cortes and Vapnik 1995), because of their flexibility and
relative simplicity. Note that the choice of classifier im-
plicitly defines the restricted set of policies where we seek
to find the optimum. In the case of SVMs, this choice is
all policies defined by a hyperplane through a high dimen-
sional space defined by a kernel function. We now consider
how outcome weighted learning and dynamic programming
translate to optimizing path-specific policies.
Finding Optimal Path-Specific Effect Policies
Consider the generalization of Fig. 1 (b) to the longitudinal
setting with mediators, shown (for two time points) in Fig. 2
(c). This causal model corresponds to the setting described
in detail in (Miles et al. 2017), representing an observational
longitudinal study of HIV patients. Here, W0 represents
the baseline variables of a patient, A1, A2 represent treat-
ment assignments, which were chosen based on observed
treatment history according to physician’s best judgement,
W1,W2 are intermediate and final outcomes (such as CD4
count or viral failure), and M1,M2 are measures of patient
adherence to their treatment regimen. We are interested in
finding policies fA1(W0), fA2(W0,W1, A1,M1) that opti-
mize the effect of A1, A2 on W2 that is either direct or via
intermediate outcomes, but not via adherence, and where
adherence is kept to that of a reference treatment a1, a2.
Specifically, we are interesting in choosing fA1 , fA2 to opti-
mize the following counterfactual expectation:
E
[
W2
(
W0, fA1(W0),M1(a1),W1(fA1(W0),M1(a1)),
M2(a1, a2,W1(fA1(W0),M1(a1)),M1(a1)),
)]
,
which is identified as
∑
W2
E[W2|W0,W1,M1,M2, fA1 (W0), fA2 (W0, fA1 (W0),M1,W1)]×
p(W0)p(M1|a1,W0)p(W1|W0, fA1 (W0),M1)p(M2|W0,W1, a1, a2)
(15)
More generally for k time points, we wish to learn policies
fA1 , . . . , fAk that optimize
E
[
Wk
(
{fA1}(A1W1)→,...,(A1Wk)→ , . . . , {fAk}(AkWk)→ ,
(a1)(A1M1)→,...,(A1Mk), . . . , (ak)(AkMk)→
)]
,
which is identified by the appropriate generalization of (15):∑
Wk
E[Wk|W0, . . . ,Wk−1,M1, . . . ,Mk, fA1(W0), . . . , fAk (Ak)]×
(
k−1∏
i=1
p(Wi|W0, . . . ,Wi−1, fA1(W0), . . . , fAi(Ai))
)
×
(16)(
k∏
i=1
p(Mi|W0, . . . ,Wi−1, a1, . . . , ai)
)
.
The dynamic programming approach to learning optimal
policies within a restricted class given by our chosen classi-
fication method proceeds as follows. We solve a sequence of
recursive classification problems with a weighted 0-1 loss.
In the base case, choosing A∗k correctly yields no penalty,
while choosing A∗k incorrectly yields the penalty∑
Mk
{E[Wk|A
∗
k, Ak]− E[Wk|1−A
∗
k, Ak]}p(Mk|ak, Ak).
Assuming f∗Ak , . . . , f
∗
Ai+1
were already selected via clas-
sifiers minimizing appropriate loss, choosing A∗i correctly
yields no penalty, while choosing A∗i incorrectly yields a
penalty E[R(A∗i )−R(1 −A
∗
i ) | Ai], whereR(A˜i) is
Wk
[
{f∗Ai+1
}{(Ai+1Wi+1)→,...,(Ai+1Wk)→}, . . . , {f
∗
Ak
}(AkWk)→ ,
A˜i, (ai+1){(Ai+1Mi+1)→,...,(Ai+1Mk)}, . . . , (ak)(AkMk)→
]
,
and identified by the appropriate modification of (16). In
the subsequent section, we report the results of a simulation
study illustrating this dynamic programming approach with
an SVM classifier, for the two time point case (k = 2).
A Simulation Study
We demonstrated our method via a simulation study for the
model given in Fig. 2 (c). We used a 5-variate normal for
W0, logistic regression models for binary A1,M1, A2,M2,
and linear regressions for continuous-valued W2 and W1
(the latter was a 6-variable vector). We will make our sim-
ulation code available upon request. We used softmargin
SVMs which allowed row weights, as implemented in the
libsvm library, to optimize the weighted 0-1 loss, as de-
fined in the previous section, using an appropriate hinge loss
convex surrogate.
Table 1 summarizes the performance of the SVM clas-
sifiers in Stage 2 and Stage 1, respectively. We report the
accuracy of the classifiers trained using both linear and poly-
nomial (poly) kernels of various degrees (d). Table 2 sum-
marizes the averageweighted 0-1 loss incurred during policy
evaluation in both stages. As expected, it is straightforward
to optimize the second stage policy, since significant infor-
mation is available at that point via the vector A2. At stage
1, only W0 is available, which complicates deriving an op-
timal decision surface. In addition, while flexible decision
surfaces are helpful at the second stage, they appear to be
counterproductive for the first stage. We leave a detailed
investigation of weighted classification algorithms for this
problem to future work.
Table 1: Summary of weighted SVM performance accuracy for 2
time points
Stage 2 Stage 1 training accuracy (%)
training accuracy (%) Linear Poly (d=3) Poly (d=5) Poly (d=7)
Linear 78.69 83.47 75.56 67.08 67.67
Poly (d=3) 93.53 82.21 74.15 64.61 65.11
Poly (d=5) 99.18 82.10 73.75 64.76 64.87
Poly (d=7) 99.30 82.59 74.48 65.15 66.19
Table 2: Summary of average weighted 0-1 loss incurred during
2-stage policy learning.
Stage 2 average Stage 1 average weighted 0-1 loss (3 sig.figures)
weighted 0-1 loss Linear Poly (d=3) Poly (d=5) Poly (d=7)
Linear 3.762 145 252 508 491
Poly (d=3) 0.302 148 257 520 508
Poly (d=5) 0.007 152 261 532 513
Poly (d=7) 0.022 143 248 532 498
Conclusion
In this paper, we defined counterfactual responses to poli-
cies that set treatment value in such a way that they af-
fect outcomes with respect to certain causal pathways only.
Such counterfactuals arise when we wish to personalize only
some portion of the causal effect of the treatment, while
keeping other portions to some reference values. An exam-
ple might be optimizing the chemical effect of a drug, while
keeping drug adherence to a reference value.
We gave a general algorithm for identifying these re-
sponses from data, which generalizes similar algorithms
due to (Tian 2008; Shpitser 2013) for dynamic treatment
regimes, and path-specific effects, respectively, shown that
given an unrestricted class of policies the algorithm is, in
some sense, complete, and demonstrated how path-specific
policies may be optimized using outcome weighted learning
(Chen, Zeng, and Kosorok 2016).
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Appendix
Example Derivation For An Identifiable
Path-Specific Policy
We seek to identify the distribution
p(W2({fA1(W0)}(A1W1)→ , a(A1M1)→)) in Fig. 2 (a).
Then Y∗ = {W2,W1,M1,W0}, and D(GY∗) =
{{W2}, {W0,M1}, {W1}} (the graph GY∗ is shown in Fig.
2 (b)). Thus, we have three terms, a term φ{W0,M1,A1,W1}(p;G)
for W2, a term φ{W0,A1,M1,W2}(p;G) for W1, and a term
φ{A1,W1,W2}(p;G) for {W0,M1}. We have
φ{W0,A1,M1,W2}(p;G) = φ{W0,A1,M1}
(∑
W2
p;G(a)
)
= φ{W0,A1}
(
p(W0, A1,M1,W1)
p(M1 | A1,W0)
; G(b)
)
= φ{W0}
(
p(W0, A1,M1,W1)
p(M1, A1 |W0)
;G(c)
)
= p(W1 |M1, A1,W0),
where G(a),G(b),G(c) are CADMGs in Figs. 3 (a), (b), and (c),
respectively. Similarly, φ{W0,M1,A1,W1}(p;G) is equal to
φ{W0,M1,A1}
(
p(W0, A1,M1,W1,W2)
p(W1 |M1, A1,W0)
;G(d)
)
= φ{W0,A1}
(
p(W0, A1,M1,W1,W2)
p(W1,M1 | A1,W0)
;G(e)
)
= φ{W0}
(∑
A1
p(W0, A1,M1,W1,W2)
p(W1,M1 | A1,W0)
;G(f)
)
=
∑
W0,A1
p(W2 |W1,M1, A1,W0)p(A1,W0),
where G(d), G(e),G(f) are CADMGs in Figs. 3 (d), (e), and (f),
respectively. Finally,
φ{A1,W1,W2}(p;G) = φ{A1,W1}
(∑
W2
p;G(a)
)
= φ{A1}
( ∑
W2,W1
p;G(g)
)
=
p(W0, A1,M1)
p(A1 |W0)
= p(M1 | A1,W0)p(W0),
where G(a),G(g) are CADMGs in Figs. 3 (a), and (g), respectively.
Note that whenever the fixing operation for a kernel qV(V | W)
that fixes V ∈ V is such that V \ {V } ⊆ ndG(V,W)(V ), the re-
sulting kernel can be viewed as q˜V\{V }(V \ {V } |W ∪ {V }) =∑
V qV(V | W). We now combine these terms, evaluating A1 to
either a or fA1(W0), as appropriate, yielding the following expres-
sion for p(W2({fA1(W0)}(A1W1)→ , a(A1M1)→)):∑
W0,A1,M1,W1
[p(W1 |M1, fA1(W0),W0)] [p(M1 | a1,W0)p(W0)]×[∑
W0,A1
p(W2 |W1,M1, A1,W0)p(A1,W0)
]
.
A1
W0 M1
W1
w2
(a)
A1
W0 m1
W1
w2
(b)
a1
W0 m1
W1
w2
(c)
A1
W0 M1
w1
W2
(d)
A1
W0 m1
w1
W2
(e)
a1
W0 m1
w1
W2
(f)
A1
W0 M1
w1
w2
(g)
Figure 3: For G in Fig. 2 (a): (a) φ{W2}(G),
(b) φ{W2,M1}(G), (c) φ{W2,M1,A1}(G), (d) φ{W1}(G), (e)
φ{W1,M1}(G), (f) φ{W1,M1,A1}(G), (g) φ{W2,W1}(G).
Proofs
Theorem 1 Under above assumptions, p({V \Aα}(aα)) is∑
Y∗\Y
∏
D∈D(GY∗ )
φ
a{(AD)→∈α|D∈D,A6∈D}
V\D (p(V);G). (17)
Proof: Assume an NPSEM-IE for a DAG G(H ∪ V). Then
for any disjoint S1,S2 ⊆ V, {S1(a1) | S1 ∈ S1, a1 ∈
Xpas
G(V)
(S1)} is marginally independent of {S2(a2) | S2 ∈
S2,a2 ∈ Xpas
G(V)
(S2)} if S1 is marginally d-separated in the graph
G(H∪V)\(pas
G(V)
(S1)∪pa
s
G(V)
(S1)). Note that this is true even if
pasG(V)(S1) ∩ pa
s
G(V)(S2) 6= ∅, and a1 and a2 assign different
values to variables in this intersection. Pick a value assignment
v ∈ XV. Under our assumptions, p({V \Aα}(aα)) is equal to∏
D∈D(GY∗ )
p(D(apas
G(V)
(D)∩A,vpas
G(V)
(D)\A) = vD),
where apas
G(V)
(D)∩A is the set of values of A ∩ pa
s
G(V)(D as-
signed by a to edges between that set andD. A detailed derivation,
via an argument that “unrolls” the counterfactuals can be found in
the supplement in (Shpitser 2013). Each factor in the above ex-
pression is now identified via the corresponding factor in (9) by
Theorem 60 in (Richardson et al. 2017). This proves the claim. 
Theorem 2 Define GfAα as GfA before, and let Y
∗ ≡
anGfAα
(Y) \Aα. Then p(Y((f˜A)α,α)) is identified if p(Y
∗(a))
is identified, and for every D ∈ D(GY∗), and every A ∈ Aα, ei-
ther every directed edge out of A into D is in α, or every directed
edge out ofA intoD is not in α. Moreover, the identifying formula
is ∑
(Y∗∪Aα)\Y
∏
D∈D(GY∗ )
φ
a˜pas
G
(D)∩Aα
V\D
(p(V);G), (18)
where a˜pasG(D)∩Aα is defined to be {A = fA(WA) | A ∈
paαG(D) ∩ Aα} ∪ {A = f
′
A(WA) | A ∈ pa
α
G(D) ∩ Aα}, if
paG(D) ∩Aα is not empty, and is defined to be the empty set oth-
erwise.
Proof: Let α∗ be the union of α and α¯. Fix any edge intervention
aα∗ such that all edges in α¯ are assigned to appropriate values of
a. Then by Theorem 1, p(Y∗(aα∗)) is∏
D∈D(GY∗ )
φ
a{(AD)→∈α|D∈D,A6∈D}
V\D
(p(V);G), (19)
for any aα∗ . Since, by definition, p(Y
∗((f˜A)α,α)) is equal to
p(Y∗(a˜α∗)), where a˜α∗ sets values of every A with respect to
edges in α via fA evaluated at WA(a˜α∗), and sets values of ev-
ery A with respect to edges in α¯ similarly via f ′A, our conclusion
follows immediately. 
Lemma 1 Assume p1(Y (a) | w) 6= p2(Y (a) | w), and a fixed
p1(W ), p2(W ) (either equal or not). Then there exists p˜(A | W )
such that
∑
w,a
p1(Y (a) | w)p˜(a | w)p1(w) 6= p˜1(Y ) 6=
p˜2(Y ) =
∑
w,a
p2(Y (a) | w)p˜(a | w)p2(w).
Proof: Since p˜1(Y ) and p˜2(Y ) are weighted averages, to assure
their inequality it suffices to pick p˜(A | W ) in such a way that
p˜(a | w)p1(w) and p˜(a | w)p2(w) are both sufficiently close to 1.

Theorem 3 Assume p({Y (a) | Y ∈ Y∗}) is not identifiable,
where Y∗ = anGfA (Y) \A. Then p({Y (fA) | Y ∈ Y}) is not
identifiable.
Proof: Order variables in Y∗ topologically as Y1, . . . , Yk with Y i
being the set of variables inY∗ earlier in the ordering than Yi. Pick
the earlier Yi in the ordering such that p(Yi(a) | Y i(a)) is not
identified. Such a variable is guaranteed to exist, since p({Y (a) |
Y ∈ Y∗}) is not identifiable. If Y i = ∅, our conclusion is trivial
since p(Yi(a)) = p(Yi(fA)) is not identifiable. Otherwise, by a
simple extension of Lemma 1, p({Yj(fA) | Yj ∈ Y i+1 \WA}) is
not identified, and thus, neither is p({Yi(fA) | Yi ∈ Y
∗}). 
Lemma 2 Assume a fixed p1(W ),p2(W ) (equal or not), and
p1(Y1(a1, a2), Y2(a1, a2)|w) 6= p2(Y1(a1, a2), Y2(a1, a2)|w).
Then there exists p˜(A1|W ), p˜2(A2|W ) such that∑
w,a1,a2
p1(Y1(a1, a2), Y2(a1, a2)|w)p˜(a1|w)p˜(a2|w)p(w) 6=
∑
w,a1,a2
p2(Y1(a1, a2), Y2(a1, a2)|w)p˜(a1|w)p˜(a2|w)p(w).
Proof: Since p˜1(Y1, Y2) and p˜2(Y1, Y2) are weighted averages, to
assure their inequality it suffices to pick p˜(A1 | W ),p˜(A2 | W )
such that p˜(a1 | w)p˜(a2 | w)p1(w) and p˜(a1 | w)p˜(a2 | w)p2(w)
are both sufficiently close to 1. 
Theorem 4 Assume p(Y∗(aα)) is not identifiable, and let Y
∗ =
anGfAα
(Y) \Aα. Then p(Y((f˜A)α,α)) is not identifiable.
Proof: Order variables in Y∗ topologically as Y1, . . . , Yk with Y i
being the set of variables inY∗ earlier in the ordering than Yi. Pick
the earlier Yi in the ordering such that p(Yi(aα) | Y i(aα)) is not
identified. Such a variable is guaranteed to exist, since p(Y∗(aα))
is not identifiable. If Y i = ∅, our conclusion is trivial since
p(Yi(aα)) = p(Yi((f˜A)α,α)) is not identifiable. Otherwise, by
a simple extension of Lemma 2, p({Y i+1 \WA}((f˜A)α,α)) is not
identified, and thus, neither is p(Y∗((f˜A)α,α)). 
